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DEVELOPMENT OR ENVIRONMENT:

An Economic Approach

by John E. Keith
INTRODUCTION
In the years since the environmental movement has gained political
power, United States policy with respect to the environment has developed
into an all-or-nothing approach.

Zero discharge limitations, although not

currently in effect, are the final goals of Water Quality and Air Quality
legislation.

The interim limitations, Best Practical and Best Available

Technology, are aimed at forcing producers into approaching the zero discharge
requirement.

There are two aspects of the zero approach that are troubling:

first, there is a total disregard for the costs of achieving that good, just as
there

ha~;

been di s rega rd of the po 11 uti on cos ts by producers; second, there is

no recognition of the wide variances in local circumstances.

There exists

a large and well-developed body of economic theory with which to assess the
des i rabi -I i ty of these, and other, envi ronmenta 1 cont ro 1s. [See, for examp 1e,
Seneca and Taussig, 1974; Edel, 1973; Schultze and Kneese, 1975; Enthoven and
Freeman, 1973; Dorfman and Dorfman, 1972J.
ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLLUTION
Pol ~ ution

is dealt with in two

diff~rent

ways in the economics literature,

but both of the approaches have their base in the newly-developing theories
of property rights and resource ownership.
consisting of three property "rights":

Ownership has been defined as

(1) the right to the use of the

property ;. (2) the right to transform the property, including sales; and (3)
t he rig ht to exclude other users, which is the basis for collecting returns
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to the property.

When anyone of these rights are denied, misallocation of

the property is likely to result.

Misallocations that result from the

inability to exclude others from using a property are generally treated as
"common property" problems, of which pollution is just one.

A non-exclusive

property is often used as a waste-sink, since those who generate waste are
free to impose the costs associated with their waste on the owners of the
property, namely society at large.

These costs are also called externalities,

third-party effects, spillover effects, or pollution.
If the waste sinks were privately owned, there would likely develop a
market for waste disposal, so that producers would be forced to consider
the cost of waste disposal along with all other costs of production.

The

result would be that effluent would be treated as long as treatment cost was
below the disposal price, and that in general production and pollution would
be reduced.

Such a market results in an economically optimal level of

production and pollution, in that all external costs of production are
internal i zed to owners of the production processes.
Figure 1 illustrates this optimum.

As production increases, the incre-

ment to net benefits, or value, of each additonal unit pf output is smaller
and smal l er.

There are two reasons for the declining net benefits:

First,

production processes, particularly in given plants, exhibit diminishing
returns.

That is, as more inputs are added to a fixed base, say a

increments in production become less and less.

plant~

the

Second, as more of a product

is produced, it is likely that price will fall due to increased supply,
particularly if the industry as a whole is expanding.

Thus, as a firm adds

inputs and pays the price for those inputs, gross returns for each additional
unit of input are smaller, so that net returns are also smaller.
At the same time marginal social cost of production is rising.

As

more pollution is produced, clean air and clean water become more scarce;

lwr
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Figure 1.

Optimum Production Levels
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snorter in supply.

The value of the clean air and water will rise.

Thus, further production of output carries with it an increasing opportunity
cost of foregone clean air and water.
of a given product increases,

~he

It is also possible that as production

utility of all additional unit of that

product and of the income it generates declines, so that as the social value
of foregone amenities increases, the social value of the output declines.
Thus, the marginal net benefit curve is downward sloping, while the marginal
social cost curve is upward sloping.
The social optimum occurs at Xopt, since if any less of X is produced,
the marginal net benefits can be increased more than the marginal social costs;
if any Rore X is produced, the marginal social cost exceeds the marginal net
benefi ts.
There is another way in which to analyze the potential trade-offs between
production or "economic development,1I and environmental amenities.

As discussed

above, as production increases, clean air and water become increasingly scarce.
Further, due to the diminishing returns to production, the more production
increases , the greater the reduction in environmental amenities.

This

relationship gives rise to the production possibility frontier illustrated
in Figure 2.
The increMental increase i n X becomes more and more "costlyll in terms of
losses of environmental amenities.

Note the converse, however.

If pristine

environments exist, it will require relatively little in environmental
degredation to generate relatively large increases in outputs.

Decreasing

absorbtion powers of the environment are responsible for the increasing
loss of amenities as production increases.

At any point on the frontier,

the amount of X that must be given up to achieve an increment in amenities,
or vice versa, can be determined.

This

II

marg inal rate of transformation"
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Figure 2.

Production Possibility Frontier between X and Environmental Amenities
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increases as X increases.

Thus, there exists trade-offs between amenities

and production, or development.
Usin g this approach, what is the social optimum?

A function relating

social value, or welfare, or utility is superimposed on the production
frontier, as in Figure 3.

The social value of additional units of amenities

gets larger, relative to the value of output X, as more X is available, just
as in the net benefit function.

Xopt is the optimal level of production,

since for any less X, the value gain to increasing output of X is greater
than the loss of val ue in amenities, and for any production greater t han X,
the value given up in amenities exceeds the value obtained from X.

It can

be shown mathematically that the social optimum is the same for both approaches.
The Coase Theorem, among other treatises in economics literature, indicates
that the economic optimum will be reached irrespective of the property right
ownership, if transactions costs are zero.

That is, it makes no difference

in the allocation resources whether those who suffer from pollution bribe
the polluters to reduce production or the polluters pay those who suffer
from pollution for
nalize

ll

thei ~ r

suffering.

the cost of polluting.

In either case, producers must "inter-

There are, of course, differing effects on

the distribution of income, but the production levels will be identical.

It

is clear, however, that there will likely be some pollution at the social
optimum, as long as the pollution is not extremely costly, such as lifethreatening pollutants.
Since property rights to the waste sinks are not, in general, held
privately, there are grounds for social action, that is governmental interference in the market.

The objective of the governmental action should be

to achieve the socially optimum levels of production and amenities.
mental action can be of two basic forms:

Govern-

prohibitions or monetary payments.
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There may be a mixture of these forms, of course, wherein fines are part
of a prohibiti on, or limits of production are set wi t hi n which payments
are levied.

I n any event, both approaches have been used.

European govern-

ments, particularly in the Ruhr and Rhine River areas have levied pollution
t axes

of several kinds, inc 'luding a "license to po l lute."

In these rivers,

water quality has improved remarkably, and industrial development and growth
i s occuri g at a re l atively high rate.

However, neither river is po l l ution-

free.
The United States, on the other hand, has chosen to impose effluent and
stream standards, which ultimately will include zero discharge limits.
Theoretically, these effluent limitations will lead to a social optimum
only in relatively few circumstances.

If the production possibil ity

frontier )s linear; that is, the transformation of amenities to outputs is
at a constant marginal rate , and if' the value of amenities exceeds the value
of output at the intersection of the maximum value curve, the transformation
cu r ve, and the verticle axis, then zero discharge (zero production, as
illustrated) is socially optimal, as i n Figure 4.
Effluent 'Iimitations generally presuppose treatment capabilities .

Producers

will treat as long as treatment costs are less than revenue net of all other
costs inc 'luding whatever fines or charges are levied on pollution.

In the

case of the effluent charge, treatment will be used until its cost
exceeds the effluent charge, then production will continue until the effluent
charge equals the marginal net benefits, as illustrated in Figure 5.
pollution will probably occur, dependin g on the effluent charge.

Some

Production
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is socia-'ly optimal if the effluent charge equals the marginal social cost.
Assuming this equality, the imposition of zero discharge will result in
two littl e production, since X will be produced only where the marginal
treatmen~

cost is less than marginal net benefits, at Xlimit.

Note that

with an effluent charge equal to the -marginal social costs, the producer
has the option to use less efficient and less costly treatment procedures
and stil l produce, whereas for the zero discharge case, the producer must
use 100 percent efficient removal system, regardless of cost, if he is to
produce.
In the U. S. phased interim limitations call for Best Practical Technology
(assumably with respect to economic feasability as well as operational
capabilities) and Best Available Technology, both based on required treatment
or effluent levels.

These rules are effective; the recovery of the Great

Lakes is clear evidence.

The problem lies, however, in that effectiveness.

How much income and production must be foregone in order to achieve fishable,
swimmabl e waters and zero discharge?

Achieving 95, 98, and 99 percent

reductions in effluent result in an almost geometric increase in treatment
cost.

A 100 percent reduction may be so costly as to cause cessation of

production in many heavy industries.
evident (Utah State University, 1975).

Some of these costs are becoming
Just as the passage of the Clear

Water Amendments and the Clean Air Act indicated increasing costs of environmental degredation, so the relaxation of the time frames in which to achieve
the various effluent levels may indicate an emerging awareness of the opportunity
cost of producing the environmental amenities.
There is another issue with respect to zero discharge rules that is of
rMjor con:ern to Utah.

It may well be the case that in regions where indus-

trialization and pollution are heavy, a, signficant reduction in output might
be socially optimal.

However, the nation-wide application of zero discharge

-- M
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entirely ignores areas in which pollution levels are "low or unobservable
and for which a small trade-off of environmental amenities will generate
substantial increases in development or production.

In other words, popula-

tion in rural areas such as abound in Utah may be willing to accept some
increase in pollution in order to obtain development and the concommittant
higher incomes.

The failure to consider the regional trade-offs

when

pollution is often a very local problem,particularly in rural areas, may
lead to a large loss of welfare for local residents

and little gain in

welfare to anyone else.
The theoretical discussion indicates that in order to maximize social
welfare, the trade-offs between development and production and environmental
amenities be

a~sesed

over a broad range of levels of output.

Effluent

standards, particularly zero !discharges rules, generally are not set with
respect t o trade offs.

On the other hand, effluent charges will not necess-

arily lead to a social optimum without a knowledge of the relative values of
output and environmental amenities.
DeeJsion making in the face of ignorance about these trade-offs and
relative values may be worse than no policy at all.
METHODOLOGIES FOR ANALYZING TRADE-OFFS
Ther'e do exist several suggested methodologies for analyzing trade-offs
between completing objectives.

All of these methodologies are based on some

form of systems analysis, either simultaneous modeling or optimization models.
Since the relationships between production, input use, effluents, and the
environment are often complex, systems analysis is required.

Frequently,

si mulation models and optimization models are used together.

Many of these

models are constructed to generate the production frontiers.

Others are

developed to produce the social optimum, using varied techniques for establishing the values for outputs and environmental amenities.

Most of these
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techniques are opinion surveys of one form or another.

In general, t he

production models have been substantia l ly more theo retically sound and
practica 'ily useable than models that utilize the value weights.
Several of the approaches have been used in research that examined
problems i n Utah, including development of the energy corridor along the
Colorado River Basin (Utah State University, 1975; Keith, et al forthcoming),
potentia l growth in the Virgin River Basin (Keith, et al, 1977), and Great
Salt Lake management schemes (Riley, et al, 1976).

There are also others

researc h efforts being undertaken in other states Hame s , et al
example) .

~

1977, for

Many of these research efforts have revealed the two problems

with the current environmental legislation:

(1) that local problems cannot

be efficiently handled by a uniform national law, and (2) that there exist
t r ade-offs which must be considered in each situation in order that intelligent
decisions about development can be made.
For example, the imposition of a stream quality standard, which would
decrease sal i nity and sediment by a 5 to 10 percent in the Virgin River
Basin of Utah could result in a 50 to 60 percent decrease in irrigated
agriculture.

That same ki nd of standard applied to a Mid-Western river

could be achieved with a re l atively small change in agricultural and industrial production.

It has also been shown that the Colo rado River Basin

will probably result in a total containment approach to waste water, and
in little or no change in downstream water quality.

Further, the zero

discharge standards applied to small towns along the Colorado will impose
a high cost on residents and have no discernable effects a short distance
downstram.

While these examples may be somewhat atypical, the implication

for the legal restriction app roach which ignores the physical and social
t r ade-offs on a local or regional basis is clear:
diminished, not increased.

Social Welfare may be
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